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Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 6/10/11
Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb.. . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, National Direct
  50 lbs, FOB.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,   
  51-52% Lean.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., Heavy,
  Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
  FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$92.46
134.25
117.00
156.70
75.01
     *
83.72
135.50
318.82
$113.60
152.78
133.10
176.54
91.88
       *
93.08
189.00
406.30
$107.61
148.93
120.57
174.08
89.63
       *
89.19
210.12
408.35
Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.22
3.35
9.60
5.30
2.27
7.50
6.76
13.45
10.66
3.44
7.59
7.67
13.62
12.54
4.05
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Premium
  Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
150.00
82.50
     *
94.50
35.00
140.00
77.50
       *
208.50
80.50
140.00
87.50
       *
211.50
76.00
*No Market
Land is a critical input for agricultural production. At
the same time, land has long been seen as a store of wealth,
an asset that may be held for a wide range of purposes and
that may account for a significant share of a nation’s
resource stock. The way in which land is owned, used and
transferred has varied over time and throughout the world.
Laws and customs governing land ownership, use and
transfer, are known as institutions, and are extremely
important determinants of agricultural output. Insecurity of
land ownership rights, for example, may reduce not only
the incentive individual households have to make long-
term land improvements, but also generate economic and
social instability in people’s lives. 
This is the first of a series of three Cornhusker
Economics articles on the nature of land institutions around
the world, and the implications of various institutional
arrangements for agricultural development. The focus of
this article is on a particular institutional change, the
transition from collective land ownership by the state to
private land markets in the countries of the Former Soviet
Union (FSU): the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania); the Eastern European countries (Belarus,
Moldova, Russia, Ukraine); the Caucasian countries
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia); and the Central Asian
countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan).
During the Soviet era, agriculture was collectivized in
large state and cooperative farms and there was no land
market. Following dissolution of the Soviet Union, the
newly independent countries began the transition from
socialist to market economies. Part of the transition to the
market economy included reconfiguration of the land
resources, including changes in both property rights and
land use patterns through land reform and farm
restructuring (Lerman, et al. 2004). The newly independent
republics had to figure out how to transfer ownership from
the government to private households/farms. 
Extension is a D ivision of the Institute of Agriculture and Natural Resources at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln
cooperating with the Counties and the U.S. Departm ent of Agriculture.
University of Nebraska Extension educational program s abide with the non-discrim ination policies 
of the University of Nebraska–Lincoln and the United States Departm ent of Agriculture.
The FSU countries approached land reform in various
ways. Some republics moved rapidly from state-owned
agricultural enterprises (and farms) and other forms of
collectivization in agriculture, to private land ownership
and open land markets. For example, Armenia, Georgia
and Moldova moved rapidly toward complete privatization
of land holdings, joined later by Azerbaijan and
Kyrgyzstan (Lerman, et al. 2004). Belarus and most of the
Central Asian countries decided to maintain the large
collective farms of the Soviet era. Lerman, et al. (2004),
argue that rapid transition towards individual holdings in
these countries and in Russia and the Ukraine is “not
feasible for social and political reasons” (p. 331).  
The Baltic and Caucasian countries have made the
most progress in terms of privatization and farm
restructuring. In the Caucasian countries, private
ownership is allowed and land is transferable. Agriculture
in Armenia and Azerbaijan is based mainly on family
farming, while Georgia has both household farms and
larger farms that lease land from the state (Giovarelli and
Bledsoe, 2001). The Central Asian countries pursue more
socialist land policies, with few individual farms, and
agricultural land mainly being controlled by large
corporate farms. In Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan, agricultural land remains state-owned and
is not transferable (Lerman, 2005). After much debate,
Kyrgyzstan (in 1999-2000) and Kazakhstan (in 2003)
recognized private land ownership. Among the four
Eastern European countries, only Belarus does not allow
private land ownership.
The different patterns of land reform and land
privatization in the FSU are summarized in Table 1 (on
next page). It is interesting to note that the countries that
have made the most progress in land reforms, such as the
Baltic countries, have the highest political freedom; while
the countries with the slowest reform have the least
political freedom (Belarus and parts of Central Asia).
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have had the
highest growth of agricultural production since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the countries where
privatization has not taken place or has been very slow,
such as Belarus or Uzbekistan, have actually realized fairly
strong agricultural growth. It is notable that the countries
with the most liberalized land markets (the Baltics), have
had negative growth of agricultural production. These
countries have small agricultural sectors that may not be
competitive with agricultural enterprises in other countries
in the European Union, of which the Baltic countries are
members, due to their geographic location. The table also
presents data on poverty in the FSU, showing that
Armenia, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have half
or more of their populations below the poverty level.
It is interesting to contrast the Caucasian and Central
Asian countries, all of which have large agricultural
sectors but differ significantly in the extent of land
privatization. Most of the countries in these two regions
have experienced substantial growth in agricultural output.
It appears that the four countries that were integrated into
the Soviet Union later (the Baltics and Moldova), had
somewhat less time under central planning of the economy
and were able to liberalize their agricultural markets more
rapidly. Contrary to expectations, institutional change does
not appear to have a positive effect on agricultural growth.
It should be noted, however, that changes in land
institutions are still relatively recent, and it may be too soon
to tell whether private land ownership will ultimately lead
to healthier agricultural sectors. Lerman, et al. (2004) argue
that “formal privatization and formal adoption of reform do
not necessarily imply real change in farm operation and
performance” (p. 334). Finally, other factors such as the
conflict between Georgia and Russia, or geographic
location may hide the impact of institutional change on
agricultural output. 
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Table 1. Land Reform and Agricultural Privatization in the Former Soviet Union.
FSU
Countries
Land Reform
Progress
1999*
Political
Freedom
Index**
Corruption
Perception
Index 2010º
Percent of
Population
Living on 
$2.15/dayºº
Years Under
Central
Planning*
Ag 
Percent
 of GDPË
Growth of 
Ag Production
in 
Percent§
Economic
Growth in
Percent, 
2007   §§
Latvia 9 1.5 4.3 6.6 51 4.2 -21.2 10.0
Lithuania 8 1.5 5.0 3.1 51 4.3 -4.2 9.8
Estonia 8 1.5 6.5 2.1 51 2.5 -13.7 7.1
Armenia 8 4 2.6 43.5 71 22.0 62.2 13.7
Azerbaijan 8 5.5 2.4 23.5 70 5.5 48.6 25.0
Moldova 7 3 2.9 55.4 51 16.3 n/a 3.1
Kyrgyzstan 7 5.5 2.0 49.1 71 24.6 36.2 8.5
Georgia 6 4 3.8 18.9 70 11.0 -31.6 12.3
Ukraine 6 4 2.4 3.0 74 9.8 -8.7 7.9
Russia 5 5 2.1 18.8 74 4.2 -5.2 8.5
Kazakhstan 5 5.5 2.9 5.7 71 5.4 -2.3 8.9
Tajikistan 5 6 2.1 68.3 71 19.2 33.0 7.8
Turkmenistan 3 7 1.6 7.0 71 10.2 47.3 11.8
Uzbekistan 2 6.5 1.6 n/a 71 21.2 38.0 9.5
Belarus 2 6 2.5 1.0 72 9.0 11.4 9.8
 
*Source: Swinnen and Heinegg (2002). 1-2 represents systems still dominated by large scale state-owned farms, while 9-10 represents systems where
land markets and private ownerships are in place. Information on years under central planning is also from Swinnen and Heinegg (2002).
** Source: Swinnen and Heinegg (2002). 1 representing the highest level of political freedom, 7 the lowest.
º Source: Transparency International, available at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results. The scale is 1 to
10, with lower numbers reflecting more corruption. The countries with the least corruption are Denmark, New Zealand and Singapore, with scores of
9.3. The U.S. and Canadian scores are 7.1 and 8.9, respectively.
ºº Source: World Bank (2000); data for Uzbekistan is not available; countries were surveyed in 1998-1999; The value of $2.15 per day is one of the
poverty measures used by the World Bank.
 Source: CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 2010 estimates, available at Ë https://www.cia.gov.
Source: Calculated from FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) data on gross agricultural production, (available at§ 
http://faostat.fao.org/site/612/default.aspx#ancor) as the percentage change between the average values of the indices from 1992-1995, compared
with 2006-2009.
 Source: World Bank data (available at §§ http://databank.worldbank.org): 2007 chosen because it preceded the world economic recession that began
in late 2008, resulting in negative growth for many countries. 
